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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy shocks for four key 
emerging market economies - Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) ± using a 
Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-Regressive (BSVAR) approach, a Sign-Restrictions 
Vector Auto-Regressive framework and a Panel Vector Auto-Regressive (PVAR) model. 
7RJHWDGHHSHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VEHKDYLRXUZHDOVRHVWLmate fiscal 
policy rules using a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations and analyze the 
importance of nonlinearity using a smooth transition (STAR) model. Drawing on 
quarterly frequency data, we find that government spending shocks have strong 
Keynesian effects for this group of countries while, in the case of government revenue 
shocks, a tax hike is harmful for output. This suggests that there is no evidence in favour 
RI µH[SDQVLRQDU\ ILVFDO FRQWUDFWLRQ¶ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI HPHUJLQJ HFRQRPLHV ZKHUH
spending policies are largely pro-cyclical. Our findings also show that considerations 
about growth (in the case of China), exchange rate and inflation (for Brazil and Russia) 
and commodity prices (in India) drive the nonlinear response of fiscal policy to the 
dynamics of the economy. All in all, our results are consistent with the idea that fiscal 
policy can be a powerful stabilization tool and can provide an important short-term 
economic boost for emerging markets, in particular, in the context of severe downturns 
as in most recent financial turmoil. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the increase in fiscal intervention that came with 
it has renewed attention on the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilisation, as 
the current policies of fiscal consolidation and austerity threaten output recovery 
(Fontana and Sawyer, 2011). The literature is pretty much divided, with different views 
on the impact of discretionary fiscal policy. The proponents of austerity argue that high 
fiscal deficits threaten to crowd out private spending and undermine market confidence. 
Fiscal consolidation can be expansionary as it could have a positive effect on growth by 
stimulating private demand and confidence in the financial markets. 
The Keynesian perspective on the other hand argues that fiscal contraction at a 
time of recession will not aid output recovery.1 Besides, the role fiscal policy becomes 
even more important when interest rates hit a zero bound. Given this scenario, an 
expansionary fiscal policy is the way forward. The present paper therefore makes an 
empirical contribution to examine whether unexpected fiscal shocks have counter-
cyclical impact, focusing on four key emerging market economies for which there is 
limited evidence in the fiscal policy literature, providing evidence of a threshold effect 
in relation to the factors driving endogeneity of fiscal policy. 
The global nature of the current downturn implies that external demand for 
developing country exports cannot be relied upon to jumpstart a recovery process. 
Given that interest rate is already at its lowest level in most countries, there is very little 
room for monetary policy to aid recovery. The alternative stimulus to support recovery 
could come through fiscal policy as many governments are currently engaged in. But 
there is no single instrument for fiscal policy, as fiscal policy surprises can be described 
either in terms of tax cuts or increase in expenditures by a fiscal authority. Hence it is 
important to know the effectiveness of these two types of policy shocks and accordingly 
we will know which type of fiscal policy can help support recovery. 
At the same time, the ability of countries to respond can vary considerably 
depending on the size of the government. The issue of whether fiscal policy enhances or 
retards long-run economic activity has been long-debated in the literature.2 By carrying 
out a meta-analysis of a sample of 93 published studies, Nijkamp and Poot (2004) 
                                                 
1
 As we saw in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, fiscal consolidation was not successful and 
IMF-supported stabilization programmes, in particular fiscal austerity measures, contributed to output 
collapse in the first year of the programme (Mallick, 2006). 
2
 For an early literature on the role of fiscal policy in the process of economic development, see Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993). 
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provide evidence that on balance the positive effect of conventional fiscal policy on 
growth is rather weak.  
Double-digit or high single-digit inflation continues to be a major policy concern 
in many developing countries, but fiscal policy appears to be highly pro-cyclical instead 
of being counter-cyclical as it is in developed countries. In fact, one typically finds that 
these developing economies have excess productive capacity. Given that emerging 
market economies are growing well below their potential level of output, fiscal policy 
has been playing an important role in output expansion, by stimulating private 
investment via infrastructural spending by the public sector. 
As a result, understanding the role that fiscal policy can play in these four key 
emerging countries - namely, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the so called BRICs ± is 
crucial, because different fiscal policy instruments may respond either pro-cyclically or 
counter-cyclically. In this context, the task requires a deep knowledge of the models that 
describe fiscal transmission and the extent to which fiscal policy can be used as a 
stabilizing tool. In these countries, there is also a conflict between achieving fiscal 
stabilization and fiscal reforms simultaneously (Toye, 2000); it is therefore even more 
important to understand the effects of unexpected fiscal shocks in this group of key 
emerging markets. While monetary policy has become firmly based on the use of 
interest rate as the key policy instrument in a one instrument±one target framework 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2008), there is no such single instrument in the case of fiscal 
policy and it is therefore important to uncover the adverse impact of a positive tax shock 
relative to the favourable effect of a positive spending shock. 
In this paper, however, we use alternative empirical approaches to analyse the 
dynamic effects of shocks in government spending and revenues on economic activity 
in the key emerging countries. We do so by using Bayesian Structural and Sign-
Restrictions Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) models via identifying tax shocks and 
spending shocks. The basic intuition is that structural shocks can be identified by 
checking whether the signs of the corresponding impulse responses are in line with 
theoretical priors. Here we examine the impact of an unexpected fiscal shock on output 
in an economy, which can be different across countries. The channel is either direct 
government spending or tax cut leading to higher private consumption or whether both 
type of fiscal shocks stimulates private investment and thereby output recovery. 
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Our results consistently show that positive government revenue shocks (tax 
increases) do have a significant adverse effect on output, whereas positive spending 
shocks have significant positive effect. 
In addition, we show that a positive spending shock: (i) generates a strong 
increase in the commodity price, but does not seem to impact significantly on the price 
level; (ii) rises the interest rate and, thereby, may ³FURZG-RXW´SULYDWHVSHQGLQJ, which 
explains the short-lived effect on GDP; and (iii) has a negative impact on equity 
markets, as markets foresee the deterioration of the fiscal stance.  
We also carry out a panel Vector Auto-Regressive (PVAR) exercise, which 
confirms the previous findings about the expansionary effect of fiscal policy, even after 
controlling for the presence of crisis episodes. 
Then, we look at the response of the fiscal authority to several economic and 
financial developments, via the estimation of fiscal policy rules. This analysis is 
supported through the estimation of a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations (linear 
model) and a Smooth Transition Auto-Regressive framework (nonlinear model). 
The evidence suggests the existence of some nonlinearities, in particular, for tax 
rules (in the cases of Brazil, Russia and India) and spending rules (in the cases of Russia 
and China).  
Additionally, considerations about the economic growth (in the case of China), 
the exchange rate and inflation (for Brazil and Russia) and commodity prices (in India) 
explain such nonlinear pattern of fiscal policy. 
Finally, fiscal authorities seem pursue a target range for the threshold variable 
rather than a specific point target. In fact, the exponential smooth transition regression 
(ESTR) model seems to be the best description of the systematic reaction of fiscal 
policy to the dynamics of the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on fiscal 
policy. Section 3 describes the econometric methodologies used to identify the fiscal 
policy shocks and to estimate the fiscal policy rules. Sections 4 and 5 present the data 
and discuss the empirical results. In Section 6, we conclude. 
 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature 
The conduct of fiscal policy in emerging market economies confronts important 
challenges. In fact, the past fiscal policy experience can be typically associated with 
extreme episodes of monetary instability, swinging from very high inflation to financial 
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instability (Mishkin, 2000). However and despite its importance, the literature on fiscal 
policy for emerging markets is rather inexistent as research has been typically confined 
to the analysis of monetary policy (Mallick and Sousa, 2011). 
In this context, the literature on the identification of fiscal policy shocks is wide 
and incorporates different approaches. For the US, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a 
³QDUUDWLYH DSSURDFK´ WR LVRODWH SROLWLFDO HYHQWV DQG ILQG WKDW DIWHr a brief rise in 
government spending, nondurable consumption displays a small decline while durables 
consumption falls. Following the same approach, Edelberg et al. (1999) show that 
episodes of military build-ups have a significant and positive short-run effect on U.S. 
output and consumption, and that the sign of the response does not change when 
anticipation effects are taken into account. Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a Cholesky 
ordering to identify fiscal shocks and show that increases in government expenditures 
are expansionary, but lead to an increase in private investment that more than 
compensates for the fall in private consumption. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use 
information about the elasticity of fiscal variables to identify the automatic response of 
fiscal policy, and find that expansionary fiscal shocks increase output, have a positive 
effect on private consumption, and a negative impact on private investment. More 
recently, using sign restrictions on the impulse-response functions and identifying the 
unexpected variation in government spending by a positive response of expenditure for 
up to four quarters after the shock, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) find a negative effect in 
residential and non-residential investment. 
Regarding other countries, Perotti (2004) investigates the effects of fiscal policy 
in Australia, Canada, West Germany, U.S. and the U.K., and finds a relatively large 
positive effect on private consumption and no response of private investment. Biau and 
Girard (2005) find a cumulative multiplier of government spending larger than one, and 
positive reactions of private consumption and private investment in France. For Spain, 
Castro and Cos (2006) report that, while there is a positive relationship between 
government expenditure and output in the short-term, in the medium and long-term 
expansionary spending shocks only lead to higher inflation and lower output. Heppke-
Falk et al. (2006) use cash data for Germany, and find that a positive shock in 
government spending increases output and private consumption, although the effect is 
relatively small. Giordano et al. (2007) show that, in Italy, government expenditure has 
positive and persistent effects on output and on private consumption. 
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In what concerns the role of economic policy for stock prices, the attention has 
been normally targeted towards the role played by monetary policy. Rigobon and Sack 
(2003) use a heteroskedasticity-based estimator and find a significant response of the 
stock market to shocks in the interest. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that a 
hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is 
associated with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. More recently, Ardagna 
(2009) reports that fiscal adjustments based on expenditure reduction and signalling 
sounder fiscal behaviour are related with increases in stock market prices.  Using a panel 
of OECD countries, the author also shows that fiscal consolidation that lead to a 
permanent and substantial fall in government debt are linked to a stronger increase in 
stock market prices. For emerging markets, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) suggest that 
FHQWUDOEDQNVVKRXOGEHVXEMHFW WR³FRQVWUDLQHGGLVFUHWLRQ´WKURXJKLQIODWLRQWDUJHWLQJ
PDNLQJ LW KDUGHU IRU WKHP WR IROORZ DQ ³RYHUO\ H[SDQVLRQDU\ PRQHWDU\ SROLF\´ 7KH
authors argue that financial crises are strongly determined by weak institutional 
credibility. 
In terms of interest rates, according to Gale and Orszag (2003) there are two 
important reasons for why budget deficits may raise nominal interest rates: (i) they 
reduce aggregate savings when private savings do not increase by the same amount (no 
Ricardian equivalence) and if there are no compensating foreign capital inflows, which 
leads to a decrease in the supply of capital; and (ii) they increase the stock of 
government debt and, consequently, the outstanding amount of government bonds 
UHODWLYHWRRWKHUILQDQFLDODVVHWV,QWKLVFDVHWKHUHLVD³SRUWIROLRHIIHFW´DVDKLJKHU
interest rate on government bonds would be required in order to incentive investors to 
hold the additional bonds.  
While some studies find that interest rates tend to increase after a rise in the 
deficit, others do not (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). The empirical findings seem to 
depend on whether expected or current budget deficits are used as explanatory variables 
(Upper and Worms, 2003; Brook, 2003; Laubach, 2009), and also on whether yield 
differentials in Europe with respect to Germany (Codogno et al., 2003) or interest rate 
swap spreads are used as the dependent variable (Goodhart and Lemmen, 1999). For 
Europe, the existing evidence points either to a significant (although small) effect 
(Codogno et al., 2003; Faini, 2006), or to the absence of impact (Heppke-Falk and 
Hüfner, 2004). For the U.S., the effect seems to be substantially larger (Gale and 
Orszag, 2003). For OECD countries, Ardagna (2009) shows that long-term government 
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bond rates fall in periods of budget consolidation and rise when the fiscal position 
deteriorates. 
Regarding the link between fiscal policy and exchange rates, Morón and 
Winkelried (2003) highlight that emerging market economies are incapable of 
smoothing out large external shocks, due to the large and abrupt swings in the real 
exchange rate generated by sudden capital outflows. Kim and Roubini (2003) show that 
a budget deficit shock leads to an improvement in the trade balance. Corsetti and Müller 
(2006) assess the response of the trade, while Monacelli and Perotti (2010) focus on the 
joint response of trade balance, consumption and real exchange rate. The authors find 
that a rise in government spending induces real exchange rate depreciation and a trade 
balance deficit. Batini et al. (2010) show that financial frictions, especially when 
coupled with liability dollarization, severely increase the costs of a fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
Finally, looking at the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, Ferrero 
(2006) analyzes optimal monetary and fiscal policy setting in a currency union with two 
countries. The author includes a role for distortionary taxation and government debt, 
which leads to a modified optimal targeting rule for the union as a whole. Beetsma and 
Jensen (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2008) have analyzed the role of fiscal 
stabilization policy in the context of a monetary union. Monetary policy is conducted by 
a common central bank, while fiscal policy is implemented at the country level. The 
authors show that there is a stabilizing role for fiscal policy that goes beyond the 
efficient provision of public goods. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
3.1. Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Policy 
3.1.1. The Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-Regression (BSVAR) 
We estimate the following Structural VAR (SVAR) 
,, ttt
n
t
nn
cXXXL H ** * 
uu
...)( 110
1
   (1) 
 t
1
0 H* tv ,       (2) 
where ),0(~ ,| /1

tsXstH , ī/ is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of 
the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, İt are the fundamental 
economic shocks that span the space of innovations to Xt, and vt is the VAR innovation. 
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Fiscal policy can be characterized as 
i
ttt fgi H: )(      (3) 
where, gt is the fiscal policy instrument, f is a linear function, t:  is the information set, 
and itH  is the policy shock. 
We consider a recursive identification scheme and assume that the variables in 
Xt can be separated into 3 groups: (i) a subset of n1 variables, X1t, which do not respond 
contemporaneously to the fiscal policy shock; (ii) a subset of n2 variables, X2t, that 
respond contemporaneously to it; and (iii) the policy instrument in the form of the 
government spending, gt, or government revenue, tt. In accordance with the studies of 
Christiano et al. (2005) and Sousa (2010a), we include real GDP and inflation among 
the set of variables belonging to X1t. We also add the commodity price to X1t and the 
equity price to X2t, which allow us to account for the importance of these variables 
while assessing the effects of a fiscal policy shock. 
The recursive assumptions can be summarized by > @'21 ,,, ttttt XgtXX   and 
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Finally, the impulse-response function to a one standard-deviation shock under 
the normalization of I /  is given by: 
,)( 101  *LB               (5) 
We use a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm to assess uncertainty 
about its distribution. We construct probability intervals by drawing from the Normal-
Inverse-Wishart posterior distribution of B(L) and ぇ 
))'(,(~| 1^ 6 61 XXEE         (6) 
),)((Wishart~ 1
^
1 mTT 66                  (7) 
where B(L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L 
associated with the regression coefficients, く is the vector of regression coefficients in 
the VAR system, ぇ is the covariance matrix of the residuals, the variables with a hat are 
the corresponding maximum-likelihood estimates, X is the matrix of regressors, T is the 
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sample size and m is the number of estimated parameters per equation. The selected 
optimal lag length is 1 (Brazil and Russia) and 2 (China and India), in accordance with 
the standard likelihood ratio tests. 
 
3.1.2. The Sign Restrictions Vector Auto-Regression 
In this section, we describe our method in estimating the effects of fiscal shocks 
by means of sign restrictions, following Uhlig (2005). Unlike the traditional VAR 
approach, in order to completely identify the system, Uhlig (2005) proposed imposing 
sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. Identification via sign restrictions is 
relevant in this context, as our objective is to investigate the effect of shocks due to 
surprise movements in interest rates. We use the reduced-form of a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model of order p with the following standard representation: 
ttt uYLBY  1)(      (8) 
where the vector Y includes the endogenous variables, B(L) is a lag polynomial of order 
p, and the covariance matrix of the vector of reduced-form residuals u is denoted as6 . 
Identification in the structural VAR literature amounts to providing enough restrictions 
to uniquely solve for the following decomposition of the n u n estimated covariance 
matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals6 . The identification approach here is to 
represent the one-step ahead prediction errors into economically meaningful or 
fundamental shocks that there are n  fundamental shocks which are mutually orthogonal 
and normalised to be of variance one, '''' ][],[ AAAAEuuE tttt    6 HH , where this 
equation can be described as the Cholesky decomposition of 6 . 
After having estimated the reduced form VAR model, in the first step, we 
randomly draw from the posterior distributions of the matrix of reduced form VAR 
coefficients, the variance covariance matrix of tKH HUURU WHUP Ȉ 7KH XVXDO VWUXFWXUDO
VAR approach assumes that the error terms, tu , are related to structural macroeconomic 
shocks, tH , via a matrix A, hence tt Au H . This defines a one-to-one mapping from the 
vector of orthogonal structural shocks H  to the reduced-form residuals u, u=AH. The jth-
column of the identifying matrix A, a j, is called an impulse vector, as it maps the 
innovation to the jth structural shock Hj into the contemporaneous, impact responses of 
all the n variables. With the structural impulse vector a j in hand, the set of all structural 
impulse responses of the n variables up to the horizon k can then be computed using the 
estimated coefficient matrix B(L) of the reduced-form VAR. Thus the sign restriction 
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approach amounts to simultaneously estimating the coefficients of the reduced-form 
VAR and the impulse vector.  
Uhlig (2005) identification method searches over the space of possible impulse 
vectors, iiAH  to find those impulse responses that agree with standard theory.  The aim 
is to identify an impulse vector, a, where na  , if there is some matrix A, such that 
6 'AA , where ],...,[ naaA 1 , so that a is a column vector of A.  As a result, a, is an 
impulse vector if and only if there is an n -dimensional vector D  of unit length so that 
D'Aa   and, hence, '' ii
n
i
aaAA
1 
¦  6 . Once the impulse vector a has been appropriated, 
the impulse response is calculated as )()( kk ii
n
i
a HDH
1 
¦ , where ni k )(H  is the vector 
response at horizon k to the ith shock in a Cholesky decomposition of 6  (Uhlig, 2005). 
This way, we obtain a range of impulse responses that are compatible with the sign 
restrictions. 
 
3.1.3. The Panel Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) 
We also use a panel-data vector autoregression (PVAR) methodology, which: (i) 
relies on the traditional vector autoregression (VAR) approach, and, therefore, treats all 
variables in the system as endogenous; (ii) combines it with the panel-data approach - 
consequently, allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity; and (iii) increases the 
efficiency of statistical inference, avoiding the potential bias coming from a small 
number of degrees of freedom of the country level VAR. 
We specify a first-order VAR model as follows: 
i,,iti,0ti, T1,...,=   tN ..., 1,=i   +)(=Y titcdYL HQ **  (9)  
where Yi,t  is a vector of endogenous variables, * 0 is a vector of constants, * (L) is a 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator, ちi is a matrix of country-specific fixed effects, 
and H i,t is a vector of error terms. Our model also allows for country-specific time 
dummies, dc,t, which capture aggregate, country-specific macro shocks. These dummies 
are eliminated by subtracting the means of each variable calculated for each country-
year. 
Given that the correlation between the fixed effects and the regressors (due to 
the lags of the dependent variables) implies that the mean-differencing procedure 
creates biased coefficients (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988), we use a two-stage procedure in 
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which: 1) we forward mean-difference the data (the 'Helmert procedure'), thereby 
removing only the mean of all future observations available for each country-year 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995); and 2) we estimate the system by GMM using the lags of 
the regressors as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In our model, the number of 
regressors is equal to the number of instruments. 
Another issue that deserves attention refers to the impulse-response functions. 
Given that the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms may not be diagonal, one 
needs to decompose the residuals so that they become orthogonal. We follow the usual 
Choleski decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of residuals, in that after 
adopting the abovementioned ordering, any potential correlation between the residuals 
of two elements is allocated to the variable that comes first. 
 
3.2. Estimating Fiscal Policy Rules 
3.2.1. The Fully Simultaneous System of Equations 
We also identify fiscal policy shocks using a Fully Simultaneous system of 
equations approach in a Bayesian framework. Therefore, we take into consideration the 
automatic response of fiscal policy to economic activity. Moreover, we do not assume 
that the government reacts only to variables that are predetermined relative to policy 
shocks, and assume that there are no predetermined variables with respect to fiscal 
policy shock. 
In the structural VAR approach, we use Bayesian inference to assess the 
posterior uncertainty about the impulse-response functions in the Fully Simultaneous 
system of equations (Sims and Zha, 1999), and consider a Monte Carlo importance 
sampling weight algorithm.  
We consider the following set of variables > @',,,,,, tttttttt cpipytgspX  , where 
spt represents the stock price index, gt, the government spending, tt, the government 
revenue, yt, the GDP, pt, the GDP deflator, it, the central bank rate, and cpt, the 
commodity price index. In particular, we partition the data such 
that > @''2'1 ,,, ttttt XtgXX  , where: 
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The economy is divided into three sectors: a financial, a public and a production 
sector. The financial sector ± summarized by the stock prices index, spt ± reacts 
contemporaneously to all new information, in recognition of the fact that stock prices 
are determined in markets characterized by a continuous auction structure. The public 
sector ± that allows for simultaneous effects ±, comprises the equations for government 
spending and government revenue, and links them with the log real GDP, yt, the GDP 
deflator, pt, and the average cost of financing debt, it. The production sector consists of 
log real GDP, yt, the GDP deflator, pt, the average cost of financing debt, it, and the 
commodity price index, cpt. The orthogonalization within this sector is irrelevant to 
identify fiscal policy shocks correctly. All these variables are not predetermined relative 
to the fiscal policy shocks but it is assumed that the policy shock can influence them 
contemporaneously. 
Additionally, we adopt an identification of the fiscal policy shocks based on 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004). This identification scheme consists of 
two steps: (i) institutional information about taxes and transfers and the timing of tax 
collections is used to identify the automatic response of taxes and government spending 
to economic activity, that is, to compute the elasticity of government revenue and 
spending to macroeconomic variables; and (ii) the fiscal policy shock is then estimated.  
The identifying restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous effects, d0, can be 
defined as:  
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(10),  
where the parameters ij[  can be identified using external information. For 
instance, YG,[ , S[ ,G , and iG,[  are the elasticities of government spending respectively to 
GDP, the GDP deflator, and the long-term interest rate. The description of the 
elasticities used in the identification procedure is reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Elasticities of Government Spending and Revenue. 
 
Elasticities of Government Spending Elasticities of Government Revenue 
 
YG,[  S[ ,G  iG,[  YT,[  S[ ,T  iT ,[  
Brazil 0 -0.5 0 1.85 1.25 0 
Russia 0 -0.5 0 1.85 1.25 0 
India 0 -0.5 0 1.85 1.25 0 
China 0 -0.5 0 1.85 1.25 0 
Note: The estimates of the elasticities are based on Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti 
(2004), and Favero and Giavazzi (2007). 
 
3.2.2. The Smooth Transition Regression (STAR) Model 
Allowing for the case of fiscal authorities being responding differently to 
deviations of financial variables or output from their targets, a nonlinear specification 
can be formulated to account for such a behaviour. We employ a Smooth Transition 
Regression (STR) model to control for that possibility. While allowing for smooth 
endogenous regime switches, it is also able to explain when a fiscal authority changes 
its policy behaviour. 
A standard STR model for a nonlinear fiscal rule can be de.ned as follows: 
ttttt scGzzFI HKZ\  ),,(''     (11) 
where FIt denotes the fiscal policy instrument and ),...,,1( 1 kttt zzz   is the vector of k 
explanatory variables. The vectors ),...,,( 10 k\\\\   and ),...,,( 10 kZZZZ   
represent the parameter vectors in the linear and nonlinear parts of the model, 
respectively. In total, we have k+1 parameters to estimate, and some of these may be 
zero a priori. The disturbance term is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. The transition function G(さ,c,st) is 
continuous and bounded between zero and one in the transition variable st.  
We start by considering G(さ,c,st) as a logistic function of order one: 
.0,)}](exp{1[),,( 1 !  KKK csscG tt   (12) 
This kind of STR model is called logistic STR model or LSTR1 model. In this case, the 
transition function is a monotonically increasing function of st, where the slope 
parameter, K  indicates the smoothness of the transition from one regime to another, i.e. 
it shows how rapid the transition from zero to unity is, as a function of st. Finally, the 
location parameter, c, determines where the transition occurs. Considering this 
framework, the LSTR1 model can describe relationships that change according to the 
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level of the threshold variable and, consequently, an asymmetric reaction of the 
government to, for example, a high and a low debt regime. 
The STR model is equivalent to a linear model with stochastic time-varying 
coefficients and, as so, it can be rewritten as: 
.,...,1,)],,([ TtzFIzscGFI ttttttt  c cc H]HKZ\  (13) 
The combined parameters, ] , will fluctuate between \  and Z\   and change 
monotonically as a function of st. The more the transition variable moves beyond the 
threshold, the closer G(さ,c,st) will be to one, and the closer ]  will be to \ . Similarly, 
the further st approaches the threshold, c, the closer the transition function will be to 
zero and the closer ]  will be to \ . 
Given that a monotonic transition may not be a satisfactory alternative, we will 
also consider (and test for) the presence of a non-monotonic transition function. This 
can be the case where governments consider not a simple point target for the transition 
variable, but a band or an inner regime where the transition variable is considered to be 
under control. Consequently, the reaction of the fiscal authority will be different from 
the situation where transition variable is outside that regime. 
We consider the following logistic function of order two: 
,)}])((exp{1[),,( 121  cscsscG ttt KK     (14) 
where さ>0, c={c1,c2} and c1c2. This transition function is symmetric about (c1+c2)/2 
and asymmetric otherwise, and the model becomes linear when さĺ This model is 
called the quadratic logistic STR or LSTR2. If, for example, output (or wealth) is the 
transition variable, this model allows us to estimate separate lower and upper bands for 
output growth instead of a simple target value. 
Finally, we also consider the case of the exponential STR model (also known as 
ESTR model). This corresponds to the situation where the transition function is 
exponentional, that is 
,0})(exp{1),,( 2 ! KKK csscG tt                (15) 
which corresponds to the particular case of the LSTR2 model where c1=c2. Therefore, 
the transition function is symmetric. This specification enables to capture the behaviour 
of fiscal policy in the extreme regimes (when the government defines its policy 
according to economic, financial and commodities variables) as well in the central 
regime for which fiscal authorities are more independent. In practice, even though 
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several tests enable the choice between exponential and logistic models, the first 
specification is invariably used for financial data than logistic one. 
 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
We use data for the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The data are 
available at quarterly frequency and the sample covers the period 1990:1-2008:3. 
 The variables and data definitions are as follows: 
x Raw materials: Real Commodity Price Index (cpt). Used as a proxy for 
changes in the global demand and to control for the price puzzle, and 
provided by Haver Analytics.  
x Real GDP: GDP (GDPt). Used as a proxy for economic activity and business 
cycle and provided by Haver Analytics. 
x Inflation rate: Inflation Rate ( tS ). Computed from the GDP deflator and 
provided by Haver Analytics. 
x Interest rate: Nominal Central Bank Rate (it). Provided by Haver Analytics.  
x Exchange Rate: Real bilateral exchange rate versus the U.S. Dollar (er t). 
Provided by Haver Analytics. 
x Equity Price: Real Stock Price Index (spt). Compiled from Haver Analytics 
(Brazil, China, India) and Global Financial Database (Russia). 
x Government Spending: General Government Final Consumption 
Expenditure (gt). Used as a fiscal policy instrument and compiled from 
the World Bank and the OECD National Accounts. 
x Government Revenue: General Government Tax Revenue (tt). Used as a 
fiscal policy instrument and compiled from the World Bank and the 
OECD National Accounts. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 The Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Policy 
5.1.1. The Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-Regression (BSVAR) 
We start by estimating a B-SVAR based on a partial recursive identification 
scheme. Figures 1 to 4 plot the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy shock. The 
solid and dashed lines correspond to the average response and the 68 percent posterior 
probability bands (constructed using a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain algorithm based on 
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10000 draws), while the red line denotes the median response. The results can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) We show that government spending has an expansionary effect on GDP 
(in particular, for Brazil and China) which lasts for about 6 quarters, 
while a positive tax shock has a contractionary impact which is generally 
persistent. This, in turn, gives support to the existence of important 
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy in the BRICs. 
2) The interest rate tends to rise following a spending shock and this effect 
is rather persistent, a feature that highlights the possibility of important 
³FURZGLQJ-RXW´ HIIHFWV 7KLV DOVR KHOSV H[SODLQLQJ ZK\ WKH LPSDFW RI
fiscal policy on output is typically short-lived. 
3) The price level is not significantly affected by government spending 
shocks or its response is small in magnitude.  
4) Commodity prices rise sharply in the outcome of a fiscal expansion, in 
particular, for Brazil, Russia and China, and remain at a higher than 
initial level for a relatively long period. 
5)  Interestingly, while a positive spending shock is typically followed by a 
fall in taxation, a positive tax shock tends to be associated with a rise in 
government spending. Putting it differently, episodes of fiscal expansion 
tend to have an amplified effect on the economy because of the increase 
in spending and the fall in taxation. In contrast, periods of restrictive 
policies via increases in taxes generally fail to lead to fiscal consolidation 
because of the subsequent boost in government spending. 
6) Equity prices fall in response to a positive spending shock, giving rise to 
the idea that markets interpret the expansion of government spending as a 
deterioration of public finances. 
 
 17 
Figure 1: IRFs using a Partial Recursive Identification ± Brazil. 
1a ± spending shock 
 
1b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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Figure 2: IRFs using a Partial Recursive Identification ± Russia. 
2a ± spending shock 
  
2b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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Figure 3: IRFs using a Partial Recursive Identification ± India. 
3a ± spending shock 
  
3b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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Figure 4: IRFs using a Partial Recursive Identification ± China. 
4a ± spending shock 
 
4b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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5.1.2. The Sign Restrictions Vector Auto-Regression 
,QRUGHUWRIXUWKHUYDOLGDWHRXU%9$5UHVXOWVZHFDUU\RXWWKHDERYHµSXUHVLJQ
UHVWULFWLRQ¶ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ VWUDWHJy due to Uhlig (2005) using the following sign 
restrictions, not only upon impact, but for a few periods after the shock's impact. The 
sign restrictions imposed are the same as the signs observed earlier in the BVAR 
exercise. Three restrictions are imposed to identify a tax shock ± an increase in interest 
rate, a reduction in inflation, and a reduction in money growth. In addition, we also 
identify a government spending shock. We identify a tax shock first and then the 
spending shock as defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Identifying Sign Restrictions. 
 TAX GEX GDP INF CBR MON RER REQ 
Contractionary tax 
shock (increase in 
taxes) 
+ ? ± ± ? ? ? ? 
Expansionary spending 
shock (increase in 
government spending) 
? + + + ? ? ? ? 
 
The responses in Figures 5 to 11 satisfy the sign restrictions for Kk ,...,1  
quarters.  The responses of these three variables have been restricted for the first 2 
quarters, following the shock. The error bands based are illustrated as the dotted lines 
above and below the response line (the thick line), which are composed of the 16th, 84th 
and median percentiles of the impulse responses for each shock, and are based on 10000 
draws. The results can be summarized as follows: 
1) We show that fiscal policy can play a stabilising role, as fiscal policy 
shocks generally have Keynesian effects in our empirical exercise. India 
seems to have experienced the largest fall in real output following a 
contractionary tax policy shock, followed by Brazil and China. All 
countries seem to demonstrate pro-cyclicality of government 
expenditure, while tax policy shocks lead to a fall in output, showing a 
counter-cyclical effect. 
2) Inflation declines in all three countries reacting almost immediately to a 
tax policy shock, but the effect seems smallest and mostly short-lived, as 
it quickly goes back to its initial level. Inflation gets reduced, but at the 
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cost of reduction in output. Both FX and equity market responses remain 
negatively related to the response of inflation following a fiscal shock. 
3) As a spending shock is likely to give rise to an increase in market 
borrowing by the government, interest rate changes in these countries 
remain accommodative, slowly receding back to zero.  
4) The contractionary tax shock has a negative effect on output. Overall, the 
results indicate that government consumption shocks have strong 
Keynesian effects for this group of key emerging market economies, 
while in the case of tax shocks, a rise in tax reduces output in all three 
countries, which suggests that there is no evidence in favour of 
µH[SDQVLRQDU\ ILVFDO FRQWUDFWLRQ¶ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI HPHUJLQJ HFRQRPLHV
where spending policies were assumed to be pro-cyclical. 
5) For Russia, we carried out impulse responses for spending shocks only, 
as the tax series is only available for a limited period, which reduces the 
time dimension considerably for the 8-variable VAR. The Keynesian 
argument still holds for the impact of unexpected government spending 
shocks (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 5: IRFs of Tax shocks using Sign Restriction approach - Brazil. 
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Figure 6: IRFs of Spending shocks using Sign Restriction approach - Brazil. 
 
 25 
Figure 7: IRFs of Tax shocks using Sign Restriction approach - India 
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Figure 8: IRFs of Spending shocks using Sign Restriction approach - India. 
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Figure 9: IRFs of Tax shocks using Sign Restriction approach - China 
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Figure 10: IRFs of Spending shocks using Sign Restriction approach - China 
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Figure 11: IRFs of Spending shocks using Sign Restriction approach - Russia 
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5.1.3. The Panel Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) 
In this Sub-Section, we report the results from the estimation of the PVAR. We 
transform the system in a "recursive" VAR (Hamilton, 1994) and impose a triangular 
identification structure, therefore, assuming that the shocks to the policy instrument 
affects the GDP, the price level, the interest rate and the commodity price only with a 
lag. The ordering of the variables in the system is, therefore, common in the literature 
on fiscal policy. 
Given that emerging markets have frequently been the stage for episodes of 
economic, financial and/or currency crises and that the anticipation of these events may 
affect lending and market default premia (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2006), we create two 
dummy variables, CRISIStiD ,  and 
CRISISNO
tiD
 
,
. We define the dummy variable CRISIStiD ,  as 
follows: it takes the value of 1 if either the change (year-on-year) of real GDP or real 
equity price index is more than two times the country-specific standard deviation of the 
variable; and 0, otherwise. In addition, the quarters before and after the peak of crisis 
are also marked with 1, and all other periods (normal periods) are marked with 0. By its 
turn, the dummy variable CRISISNOtiD
 
,
 takes the value of 1 in case of absence of episodes 
of crises and 0 otherwise. Then, we estimate a dummy variable augmented PVAR 
model of the form: 
CRISISNO
TICRISISNO
CRISIS
TICRISIS DYLDYL
 
,ti, ,ti,0ti, )(+)(=Y x*x**  
                       i,,i T1,...,=   tN ..., 1,=i   titcd HQ     (16)  
This robustness test checks whether the previous findings were biased because 
the episodes of crises were not appropriately controlled for. 
Figure 12 corroborates the results of the B-SVAR and the sign restriction 
approaches. In fact, it can be seen that a positive government spending shock leads to: 
(i) an expansionary effect on GDP that peaks after 12 quarters; and (ii) a boost in the 
price of commodities and the price level. In addition, the findings show that, in the 
absence of periods of extreme instability (that is, in "normal" periods), fiscal policy still 
has a strong and positive impact on GDP. 
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Figure 12: IRFs using a PVAR approach ± Spending shock. 
 
Response of COMMODITY to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
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Response of IR to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
 (p 68) GOVS
0 20
-0.8591
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Response of GDP to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
 (p 68) GOVS
0 20
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0.0195
 
Response of P to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
 (p 68) GOVS
0 20
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Response of GOVR to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
 (p 68) GOVS
0 20
-0.0347
0.0421
 
Response of GOVS to Shock in GOVS
s
 (p 32) GOVS  GOVS
 (p 68) GOVS
0 20
0.0000
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5.2. Fiscal Policy Rules 
5.2.1. The Fully Simultaneous System of Equations 
We now look at the result provided by the estimation of the Fully Simultaneous 
System of Equations. 
Figures 13 to 16 plot the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy shock. 
The solid and dashed lines correspond to the average response and the 68 percent 
posterior probability bands constructed by using a Monte-Carlo importance sampling 
normalized weights algorithm, and based on 50000 draws. The red line denotes the 
median response. The results can be summarized as follows: 
1) Government spending seems to generate strong Keynesian effects, 
reflected in the expansionary effect on output, while a positive tax shock 
leads to a contraction of economic activity. 
2) The borrowing costs rise after the shock in government spending, 
thereby, ³FURZGLQJ-RXW´private spending. 
3) Inflation does not seem to be significantly impacted by spending shocks, 
but the price of commodities rises dramatically. 
4) Episodes of fiscal expansion via the spending side tend to be followed by 
tax cuts, while episodes of fiscal contraction via the revenue side are 
typically associated with a subsequent rise in government spending. 
5) Markets interpret the rise in government spending as a signal of a 
deterioration of the fiscal stance or as a future increase of risk premium 
(Sousa, 2010b). As a result, equity prices fall after a positive spending 
shock. 
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Figure 13: IRFs using a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations ± Brazil. 
13a ± spending shock 
 
13b ± tax shock 
  
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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Figure 14: IRFs using a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations ± Russia. 
14a ± spending shock 
  
14b ± tax shock 
  
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
 34 
Figure 15: IRFs using a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations ± India. 
15a ± spending shock 
  
15b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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Figure 16: IRFs using a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations ± China. 
16a ± spending shock 
 
16b ± tax shock 
 
Solid and dotted lines ± average response and 68% posterior probability intervals; Red solid line ± median response. 
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5.2.2. The Smooth Transition Regression (STAR) Model 
This section aims to study the effect the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy 
shocks for the BRICs in a nonlinear framework using STR model. The introduction of 
nonlinearity can be justified by the potentially asymmetric effect of fiscal policy 
according to the phase of a business cycle. Furthermore, we expect that the determinants 
of fiscal policy also vary according to regimes. The main advantage of STR modelling 
is to the enable the dynamics to be time-varying and to define it according to regime. 
In practice, we carried out the STR modelling in several steps according to 
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Teräsvirta (1998) and Van Dijk et al. (2002). First of all, 
we specify the linear model for the government consumption and government revenue. 
In particular, we have included Real Commodity Price Index (cpt),  Real GDP, Inflation 
rate: Inflation Rate ( tS ), Interest rate: Nominal Central Bank Rate (it), Exchange Rate 
(er t), Equity Price (spt), the money growth  as explanatory variables. Second, we have 
tested the linearity hypothesis using Lagrange Multiplier Tests of Luukonen et al. 
(1988) that test the linearity against the nonlinearity of STR type.4 Tests of linearity are 
carried out for several transition variables and the optimal variable is that for which the 
rejection of linearity is the strongest. From the empirical results reported in Table 3, we 
note that linearity is strongly rejected for Russia for both government consumption and 
tax variables, for Brazil and India only for tax variable and for China at 10% level only 
for government consumption. These results are interesting as they suggest some 
nonlinearity in the transmission of fiscal shocks.  Third, we apply a list of Fisher Tests 
introduced by Teräsvirta (1998) to specify the transition function: logistic or 
exponential. According to the results,5 the exponential is a priori more appropriate to 
reproduce the transition between regimes for the most series for which linearity is 
rejected. 
Table 3: Linearity Tests (LM3 Test). 
Country Series LM Test (P-value) 
Brazil Spending 0.56 
Tax 0.02 
Russia Spending 0.0 
Tax 0.0 
India Spending 0.35 
Tax 0.03 
China Spending 0.08 
Tax 0.27 
                                                 
4
 For more details about these tests, see Van Dijk et al. (2002). 
5
 We do not report these results in order to save space, but results are available upon request. 
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Table 4: Nonlinear fiscal policy rules. 
 Brazil Russia India China 
Linear part (\ ) gt tt gt tt gt tt gt tt 
Constant - 0.023 
[1.61] 
0.007 
[0.65] 
0.05 
[1.14] 
- 0.012 
[0.57] 
-0.03 
[-0.51] 
- 
cpt - -0.121 
[-0.56] 
0.139 
[0.83] 
-0.49 
[-0.58] 
- 0.68* 
[2.06] 
-0.912 
[-0.70] 
- 
spt  - -0.12 
[-0.64] 
0.074* 
[2.9] 
-0.117 
[-1.19] 
- 0.02 
[0.04] 
-0.023 
[-0.40] 
- 
ert - 0.30* 
[2.11] 
0.262 
[1.5] 
-1.05 
[-1.37] 
- -0.131 
[-0.56] 
0.194 
[0.33] 
- 
yt - 0.53 
[0.61] 
1.39* 
[3.4] 
0.121 
[0.11] 
- 1.31* 
[1.99] 
9.20 
[0.66] 
- 
tS  - 0.44* [2.15] 0.072 [0.47] -2.64* [-3.0] - 0.312 [0.55] -0.362 [-0.09] - 
mt - 0.47* 
[2.3] 
0.137 
[0.76] 
-1.06 
[-1.52] 
- -0.284 
[-0.46] 
-0.434 
[-0.89] 
- 
it  - - -  - -  
Nonlinear part (Z )         
Constant - -0.01 
[-0.52] 
-0.005 
[-0.22] 
-0.04 
[-1.06] 
- -0.102** 
[-1.77] 
0.07 
[1.47] 
- 
cpt - 0.263 
[0.91] 
-0.40 
[-1.5] 
 
0.287 
[0.32] 
- -0.966** 
[-1.79] 
0.78 
[0.57] 
- 
spt  - 0.223 
[1.07] 
-0.385* 
[-3.9] 
0.164 
[1.44] 
- -0.012 
[-0.08] 
-0.03 
[-0.62] 
- 
ert - -0.325** 
[-1.77] 
-0.679* 
[-3.0] 
1.47* 
[2.03] 
- -0.034 
[-0.05] 
-0.46 
[-0.58] 
- 
yt - -0.612 
[-0.52] 
-3.80* 
[-3.4] 
1.88 
[1.19] 
- -0.056 
[-0.15] 
-20.9 
[-1.57] 
- 
tS  - -0.545* [-2.52] 0.619* [2.33] 3.19* [3.71] - -4.15* [-2.25] -3.94 [-0.92] - 
mt - -0.828* 
[-3.01] 
1.20 
[1.5] 
0.71 
[0.95] 
- 3.72** 
[1.65] 
0.40 
[0.59] 
- 
it  - - -  - -  K  
- 38.4** 
[1.93] 
1.84* 
[2.1] 
6.43** 
[1.85] 
- 10.5** 
[1.93] 
200.6 
[1.4] 
- 
C - -0.20* 
[-20.6] 
-0.065 
[-6.3] 
0.012* 
[2.6] 
- 0.05* 
[4.2] 
0.02* 
[30.9] 
- 
Obs. - 57 52 54 - 49 46 - 
R2 - 0.46 0.79 0.93 - 0.65 0.47 - 
Model - ESTR ESTR  - ESTR ESTR - 
st  - spt cpt cpt - cpt cpt - 
Notes: * statistically significant at 5% level; ** at 10% level. All variables are in log differences. The t-
ratio statistics are in square brackets. st denotes the transition variable. 
 
Fourth, we estimated the STR models by the Nonlinear Least Squares Method 
after initializing the parameters. We report the main important results in Table 4. 
Accordingly, we note for Brazil strong evidence on nonlinearity in tax rules dynamics. 
Indeed, our findings show significant time varying dynamic and transition between 
regimes. Also, we note strong interaction between fiscal shock, exchange rate, inflation 
and the money growth. Interestingly, the interactions between these variables seem to be 
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asymmetrical as these effects are positive in the first regime but negative and significant 
in the second regime. 
For China, the nonlinearity characterizing the government consumption seems to 
be less significant as suggested by the linearity test (rejection at 10% level). Also, our 
finding capture a significant nonlinear relationship only between with the GDP and 
government consumption (at 12% level). Even though the threshold parameter is 
significant, the non rejection of omitted nonlinearity in the residual suggests the 
presence of other type nonlinearity notably because the transition speed is higher 
suggesting rather an abrupt adjustment.  
Regarding India, we note significant linear relationship between tax rules, GDP 
and commodity prices, while nonlinearity characterizes much more the relationship 
between tax and inflation. Also, the exponential function seems to appropriately 
characterize the transition between Tax regimes even though the transition speed is 
rather less than for Brazil.  Also while for Brazil, the transition between tax rule regimes 
is determined by equity markets, the transition is rather associated with commodity 
market.  
For Russia, both government consumption and tax variables are characterized by 
nonlinear dynamics. Regarding the government consumption, we note several important 
results. On the one hand, nonlinearity and smoothness significantly characterize its 
dynamic. On the other hand, we have noted several significant and positive effects 
between government consumption and other macroeconomic variables such as equity 
price, GDP. The same variables as well as the exchange rate also affect negatively and 
in a nonlinear manner the government consumption dynamics, suggesting strong 
evidence of nonlinear time-varying relationships. For tax rules, they seem to be 
nonlinear and significantly governed by inflation, exchange rate. The relation within 
inflation alternate from negative to positive according to the regime. 
Overall, these findings highlights evidence of nonlinearity and time varying in 
the dynamics of fiscal rules and the transmission of fiscal shocks. We also note that 
these relationships vary according to regimes. In order to illustrate this switching, we 
have reported in Figure 17 and 18 the estimated transition functions. 
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Figure 17: Transition Functions for Tax in Brazil, Russia and India. 
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Figure 18: Transition Functions for Spending in Russia and China. 
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The analysis of these Figures provides several interesting findings. First, for tax, 
the dynamics of the transition function shows significant smoothness and persistence for 
India and Russia. The profile of the transition function for Brazil is different, which can 
mean that the transmission of tax shock is more abrupt, confirming our analysis of the 
transition speed. Also, the persistence associated with the government consumption is 
more significant for Russia than for China. Second, the transition function reaches the 
unity only for China and Brazil, which can indicate a faster speed in the transmission of 
fiscal shock and can also be supported for China by its high growth. 
 
Figure 19: Time-varying transition functions for Tax in Brazil, Russia and India. 
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We also report the dynamic profile of the transition function for the sample 
under consideration (Figures 19 and 20). This should inform about the intensity of 
adjustment and the transition between fiscal regimes. In particular, we note the high 
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volatility of transition and adjustment notably for Brazil and China suggesting important 
dynamic associated with the fiscal rules. These effects are less significant for the other 
countries. 
 
Figure 20: Time-varying transition functions for Spending in Russia and China. 
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Finally, in order to check the validity of nonlinear estimation, Table 5 reports 
several misspecification tests. Accordingly, we point out several important findings. 
First, we note the high superiority of nonlinear modeling in relation to linear model to 
reproduce the effect of fiscal shock notably for Russia for which the residua variance is 
significantly reduced after the introduction of nonlinearity. Second, the residuals do not 
show any ARCH effect. They are stationary and indicate omitted nonlinearity for China 
and Brazil. 
Table 5: Misspecification tests. 
 Brazil Russia India China 
 gt tt gt tt gt tt gt tt 
L
STR
V
V
 
- 0.81 0.32 0.17 - 0.70 0.74 - 
ADF Test - -5.25 -5.17 -3.55 - -5.43 -5.71 - 
ARCH Test 
(P-Value)
 
 
 0.34 0.65 0.65 - 0.73 0.77 - 
DW  1.84 2.31 2.13 - 2.15 2.14 - 
Fisher Test 
(P-value) 
- 0.159 0.0 0.02 - 0.02 0.149 - 
 
ONLLM Test (P-value) 
- 0.91 0.17 0.32 - 0.03 0.08 - 
Normality Test (JB)  0.00 0.0 0.25 - 0.0 0.23 - 
Notes: ADF, DW, JB, LMONL respectively denote Dickey-Fuller Test, Durbin-Watson Test, Jarque-Bera 
test and nonlinear omitted test. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper provides time-series and panel evidence on the fiscal policy 
transmission for four key emerging market economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(BRICs). 
We use modern estimation techniques ± namely, the Bayesian Structural Vector 
Auto-Regressive (B-SVAR) and the panel VAR (PVAR) - to identify the fiscal policy 
shock along with the more recent Sign-Restrictions approach. 
We show that an expansion of government spending: (i) has a strong and 
positive effect on output; (ii) leads to a sharp rise in the commodity price, but does not 
seem to impact significantly on the price level; (iii) rises the interest rate and, thereby, 
FDQ³FURZG-RXW´SULYDWHVSHQGLQJDQGLYhas a negative impact on equity markets in 
light of the expectations about a deterioration of the fiscal stance.  
In the case of an increase in government revenue, a rise in tax reduces output in 
DOOFRXQWULHVZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHLQIDYRXURIµH[SDQVLRQDU\ILVFDO
FRQWUDFWLRQ¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIHPHUJLQJHconomies. 
To summarize the response for this group of key emerging market economies, 
we carry out a panel VAR exercise, which provides further robustness of our finding 
that expansionary fiscal policy has a positive effect on output. These results remain 
robust even after controlling for the presence of crisis episodes. 
Then, we assess the reaction of the fiscal authority to several economic and 
financial developments, via the estimation of fiscal policy rules. To do so, we estimate a 
Fully Simultaneous System of Equations and analyze the importance of nonlinearity 
using a smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model. 
We find strong evidence that the fiscal policy followed by governments in the 
BRICs exhibits nonlinearity. In particular, such nonlinearity is more relevant for tax 
rules (in the cases of Brazil, Russia and India) and for spending rules (in the cases of 
Russia and China).  
In addition, we show that considerations about the economic growth (in the case 
of China), the exchange rate and inflation (for Brazil and Russia) and commodity prices 
(in India) seem to be the major drivers of such nonlinear pattern of fiscal policy. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that the fiscal authorities pursue a target range 
for the threshold variable rather than a specific point target. In fact, the exponential 
smooth transition regression (ESTR) model seems to be the best description of the fiscal 
policy rule in these countries. 
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The current work provides the basis for forecasting future government¶s policy 
behaviour in the major emerging market economies. As a result and from a policy 
perspective, it provides important insights about the major economic and financial 
developments to which the fiscal authority reacts in a systematic manner. 
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